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An Alternative Approach to Malware Research 
 
C.J. May 
Department of Computer Science 
University of Northern Iowa 
Abstract --- Current antivirus programs have design 
flaws that allow malware to bypass detection. Despite 
this, malicious parties are usually the ones to find and 
exploit these flaws before they can be fixed. 
Therefore, a more proactive approach to malware 
research should become the new standard. To that 
end, a new programming language will be designed 
and created that sheds light on a couple of design 
flaws in current antivirus models. Fundamentally, 
antivirus programs have trouble detecting 
interpreted languages. In addition, it is suspected that 
antivirus programs are unable to detect an unknown 
programming language that is injected into another 
file thus creating polyglot code. The Jaws 
programming language has been designed to exploit 
both of these weaknesses, and its implementation 
proves that such a language can exist. 
Index Terms --- artificial intelligence (AI), instruction 
modification parameter (IMP) 
I. Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to prove that 
even the most advanced antivirus programs have design 
gaps in detecting emerging threats, and that a more 
proactive approach to malware research must become the 
new standard. The proactive approach to be tested in the 
hypothesis should be thought of as a kind of vulnerability 
research for antivirus programs. The exploited 
vulnerability in this research is purported to shed light on 
an unintended design flaw in antivirus software. 
 
II. Literature/Source Review 
 To understand vulnerability research and why it 
is done, we must first explore the topics of malware and 
antivirus software. In November of 1988, the world had 
a wake up call about the potential severity of malicious 
programs. A graduate student at Cornell University, 
Robert Morris, wrote a program later called the Morris 
Worm that ended up bringing down almost the entire 
internet in just 24 hours [3]. This was before the world 
wide web, so the chaos was not quite as wide-spread as it 
would be today. Nevertheless, there was estimated to be 
millions of dollars in damages. The incident caused the 
whole world to understand how vulnerable computers 
had become. Even today, preventing the infection of 
malicious software (malware) largely remains a game of 
cat-and-mouse. 
Since the Morris Worm brought down the whole 
internet, people have better understood the power of 
malware. Malicious hackers, hacktivists, and even nation 
states now develop malware for the purpose of 
manipulating computers for financial or political gain.  
For example, in 2010 the United States and Israel 
launched a cyber attack called Stuxnet that destroyed 
Iran’s nuclear facilities in an effort to stymie their efforts 
in developing nuclear weapons [5]. That attack was also 
a type of worm, and it was able to be spread by USB 
drives. The most interesting part of the Stuxnet attack 
was that it proved that malware can not only affect cyber 
space; malware can impact physical space as well. 
Other than worms, there have been many 
different types of malware that have emerged [10]. 
Adware delivers mass ads to infected computers. 
Ransomware holds a system’s files captive via 
encryption and only returns them in exchange for 
payment. Spyware records and exfiltrates a user’s 
activity without them knowing. Trojan Horses disguise 
themselves as a normal program but do malicious things 
in the background. There are other kinds of malware as 
well, and all have to do with manipulating infected 
computers to do the attacker’s bidding. 
As the prevalence of malware has increased, so 
have measures to detect and prevent malware. Antivirus 
programs are an example of software designed to combat 
malware. Antivirus programs scan the files on a 
computer and evaluate whether or not they are malicious. 
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If a file is found to be malicious, it is deleted or 
quarantined. Of the most popular antivirus programs [9], 
there are two main categories of antivirus software: 
signature-based and artificial-intelligence-based. 
Signature-based antivirus has been around for a 
long time because it has proven to be mostly effective [8]. 
Signature-based antivirus programs keep definitions, or 
“hashes,” of known malware and periodically scan a 
computer’s file system looking for a matching hash [6]. 
If a file matches known malware, the antivirus program 
deletes or quarantines the file. Signature-based antivirus 
excels at finding the most common types of malware that 
are currently wreaking havoc in the wild. 
There are several weaknesses to the signature-
based model, however [6]. New strains of malware go 
completely undetected since they are not yet in the 
antivirus’s definition list. In addition, the sheer volume 
of unique malware can make a definition list quickly 
grow too big in size, and most signature-based antivirus 
have to leave out many definitions for this reason. 
Polymorphic, or self-changing, malware is also very 
good at evading detection because it is able to change its 
signature every time it replicates. Although signature-
based antivirus excels at stopping known malware, 
advances made by cyber criminals in malware design 
have been slowly making it less effective. 
The weaknesses of signature-based antivirus 
have been mostly addressed in a newer, emerging type of 
antivirus based on behavior. At the front of the behavior-
based antivirus industry is AI (artificial intelligence). AI-
based antivirus [4] doesn’t require large databases of 
malware hashes to look out for. Instead, the software 
contains a neural network that has been trained to 
positively identify files that look like malware. This not 
only removes the need for large definition files, but it also 
allows the antivirus software to identify new and 
polymorphic threats that somewhat resemble known 
malware. 
Unfortunately, there are still some caveats to the 
current AI-based antivirus models. Some AI-based 
antivirus programs scan compiled binary files for strings, 
and use those strings to derive a malware score [2]. One 
vulnerability found in this model is to inject the malware 
with “happy” strings that would make the file look less 
suspicious. This vulnerability has been exploited by 
researchers against Cylance Protect, the leading vendor 
in the AI antivirus field [2]. Cylance fixed the 
vulnerability before it could be exploited in the wild 
because it was responsibly disclosed by the researchers. 
Another way to evade AI-based antivirus is to 
write malicious code in a language that is not compiled 
to binary [7]. The difference between a compiled 
language and one that runs on a virtual machine should 
first be explained. At a high level, a computer is a 
complex machine that only interprets 1’s and 0’s 
(binary), and it uses those signals to perform calculations 
and tasks. When programmers write code, it has to be 
translated into binary before it can be run. A program that 
performs this translation is called a compiler. A compiler 
is a complex program. First, it inputs a text file written in 
a language, or code, defined for the compiler. Then, after 
performing lots of operations, the compiler outputs an 
executable program in the form of a binary file. A virtual 
machine is similar to a compiler, but it does not output 
the translated binary to an executable file. Instead, once 
a virtual machine interprets an instruction from the input, 
it executes it on behalf of the code. 
Languages that run on virtual machines such as 
Java are an example of this. These types of programming 
languages are interpreted and immediately executed 
rather than compiled to binary and saved to an executable 
file which makes them harder or impossible for an 
antivirus program to detect [7]. Unpublished research 
done by my colleague Tony Nizzi concluded that the 
engine for any kind of antivirus software would need to 
include some form of the virtual machine that the code 
runs on in order to be able to detect it through static 
analysis. This would greatly increase the size of the 
antivirus program for each virtual machine included. In 
addition, less popular or new virtual machines would 
almost assuredly not be included. 
 
III. Hypothesis 
Both models of antivirus software have proven 
to be effective against the majority of malware; however, 
what would happen if a new kind of threat emerged that 
was designed specifically to evade both AI and signature-
based antivirus? It would be better if this kind of threat 
were accounted for before it may be unleashed by a 
malicious party. The hypothesis for this thesis is that this 
kind of proactive approach to malware research would 
greatly benefit the antivirus industry. As shown by the 
Cylance Protect case, there are weaknesses in even the 
most advanced antivirus models that can be fixed [2]. To 
test the hypothesis, research must be done to design and 
develop a proof of concept malicious program that is able 
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to evade even the most advanced antivirus software. 
Then, mitigation techniques will be offered to show that 
improvements to current anti-malware models can be 
made. 
 
IV. Methodology 
The proof of concept program for this research 
must be capable of exploiting the weaknesses of both 
models of antivirus. Therefore, a virtual machine for a 
completely new language must be designed. For the 
proof of concept in this research, a new programming 
language called Jaws has been designed that runs on a 
custom virtual machine. Jaws is an esoteric, interpreted 
programming language that is based on another, called 
Whitespace [11], with added functionality. Jaws is an 
imperative, stack based language in which the only 
lexical tokens are the characters Space, Tab, and New 
Line. These characters, being invisible, are commonly 
called “whitespace”. The name Jaws is an acronym (Just 
Another WhiteSpace), but the word itself was also 
intended to hold meaning because the code, being 
invisible to the human eye, is like a threat hidden beneath 
the surface. The reason for this is that Jaws was 
specifically designed to enable it to be used in polyglot 
code. 
Polyglot code is a computer program or script 
contained in a single file, yet written in a valid form of 
multiple programming languages. Jaws interprets only 
whitespace characters while ignoring all other characters. 
Because of this, it is possible to easily create polyglot 
code by injecting Jaws into many types of files. This 
includes, but is not limited to: other programming 
languages, markup languages, text files, and image files. 
The next section of this document goes into detail about 
how Jaws code would be injected into various types of 
files without breaking either one’s functionality. 
The Jaws virtual machine has been designed to 
ignore any whitespace characters that are deemed to be 
not part of the Jaws program. This is made possible with 
the definition of a header and a footer that designate 
which areas of a file should be interpreted as Jaws code. 
In the lexer component of the Jaws virtual machine, 
character interpretation is stalled until the Jaws header 
has been scanned from the file. After the header has been 
scanned, any whitespace characters are then interpreted 
as Jaws code. If the footer is scanned after any complete 
statement, the lexer will again stall interpretation until 
another header has been read. The signal for end-of-
program is interpreted differently than the footer, which 
allows Jaws code to be broken up and scattered 
throughout different parts of a file. 
Programming and markup languages that are 
not whitespace controlled such as Javascript, C/C++, 
Perl, and HTML/CSS can be injected with Jaws code 
very easily. These kinds of languages usually require an 
arbitrary number of whitespace characters between 
tokens, but do not have strict requirements on the type, 
amount, or arrangement. The only requirement for this 
type of code injection is that every instance of a 
whitespace character in the original code is replaced with 
a part of the Jaws code. This requirement is to prevent 
whitespace characters not part of the Jaws code from 
being interpreted by the Jaws virtual machine while it is 
interpreting. 
Jaws can be injected into Python code, but the 
process is slightly more complex than it is for most other 
programming languages. Because spacing and 
indentation matter in Python code, Python requires a 
fixed pattern of whitespace characters within its code. It 
cannot be modified to replace spaces or tabs with an 
arbitrary amount of whitespace characters, nor can it 
prepend/append whitespace characters to a line of code. 
Whitespace can, however, be found in arbitrary 
arrangements on their own lines within Python code. This 
means that lines of Jaws code can be placed before or 
after lines of Python code without interfering with 
Python’s interpreter. In addition, because of the 
implementation of the Jaws header and footer, the 
required whitespace in the Python code can be ignored by 
the Jaws lexer. 
Files that consist of plain text in the form of 
unicode or ascii characters can be injected in the same 
way as non-whitespace-controlled programming 
languages. The only difference with plain text files is that 
you can technically place the whitespace characters from 
the Jaws code anywhere without breaking the 
'functionality' of the text file. The requirement of 
removing all previously existing whitespace characters 
still exists, but they technically do not need to be replaced 
in the same location unless you want to retain the 
groupings of characters that form 'words'. 
Jaws code can also be injected into image files 
because of the Jaws header and footer. Many image file 
types can be injected with another file, completely hiding 
the second file in the process. This is because image files 
such as JPEG, PNG, and GIF ignore all data following 
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their footer. Anything after the image footer is ignored by 
programs opening the file. Therefore, any type of file or 
language that is interpreted starting at a designated 
header can be placed below an image footer in the same 
file. Because the Jaws virtual machine can begin 
interpretation at a designated header, it can ignore any 
'whitespace' found in the image binary and then begin 
interpretation at any time after. In fact, Jaws code can 
also be injected into an image file that has already been 
combined with another file such as a zip archive. 
The ability of Jaws code to be injected into other 
files is the key trait that allows it to achieve a high level 
of obfuscation. Jaws can truly hide in plain sight. It is 
expected that automated static analysis techniques will be 
completely thrown off by the original file’s type or 
language. Even humans performing manual analysis 
should be unlikely to catch the hidden Jaws code because 
it is invisible to the human eye. Additionally, one of the 
first things that is done when doing manual analysis on 
malicious source code is to clean up the whitespace and 
make it more readable. In the case of a polyglot file 
injected with Jaws code, this would only erase the 
evidence. This design choice in the proof of concept is to 
prove that even the most advanced malware detection 
techniques have serious gaps. 
Another design choice in the proof of concept 
was to write the virtual machine in the C programming 
language so it can run on any architecture that C compiles 
to. Since C can be compiled to almost any architecture, 
the Jaws virtual machine can be run almost anywhere as 
well. This includes computers with x64 architecture 
(most laptops, desktops, and servers), ARM architecture 
(embedded systems and mobile phones), and even web 
browsers via WebAssembly. This opens up a lot of attack 
vectors that will have to be explored and evaluated 
separately, since malware prevention software looks 
different on all of these targets. 
 
V. Implementation 
 The Jaws programming language had a lot of 
thought put into the design in order to meet the 
requirements set in the hypothesis. The final language 
specification for Jaws that is implemented in the Jaws 
virtual machine is shown in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1: Jaws Language Specification 
Jaws Language Specification: 
Lexical Tokens 
The only lexical tokens in Jaws are Space (ASCII 3210), Tab, (ASCII 910), and Line Feed (ASCII 1010). The choice to 
use line feed only and not carriage return was to avoid DOS/Unix conversion problems. 
Starting/Stopping Interpretation 
Jaws code will only interpret whitespace tokens in the section of the file between the Jaws Header and Footer. There 
can be any number of such sections in the same file. This gives the Jaws interpreter the ability to start and stop 
interpretation any number of times until the End-of-Program statement is reached. The tokens that make up the Header 
and the Footer are identical, but the End-of-Program instruction is unique and signals the end of the program. 
[LF][Tab][Space]   Header/Footer 
[LF][LF][LF]    End-of-Program 
Instruction Set 
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Each instruction consists of two parts: The Instruction Modification Parameter (IMP) and the command. The IMP 
describes what type of operation the command is. The command is interpreted based on which IMP preceded it, and 
it is then executed accordingly. The IMPs and their commands are listed below. 
Instruction Modification Parameter (IMP) 
The IMP is the first part of a Jaws instruction. The command following it will be interpreted differently depending on 
which IMP is selected. The chart below illustrates each IMP: 
[Space][Space]   Stack Manipulation 
[Space][Tab]    Arithmetic 
[Tab][Tab]    Heap Access 
[LF][Space]    Flow Control 
[Tab][LF]    I/O Action 
[Tab][Space]    I/O Control 
Commands 
The commands for each IMP are organized together. The character(s) for the command follow directly after the IMP's 
characters with no delimiter. Some commands require a parameter as a part of the instruction. In these cases, the 
parameter will immediately follow the command in the form of a binary number. [Space] represents 0, [Tab] represents 
1, and a [LF] signals the end of the parameter. Read more on parameters below the commands. 
Stack Manipulation (IMP: [Space][Space]) 
Stack manipulation is the most commonly used instruction type. There are four stack instructions. 
[Space] (Parameter: Data)   Push a literal onto the stack 
[LF][Space]    Duplicate the top item on the stack 
[LF][Tab]    Swap the top two items on the stack 
[LF][LF]    Discard the top item on the stack 
 
Arithmetic (IMP: [Space][Tab]) 
Arithmetic commands operate on the top two items on the stack, and replace them with the result of the operation. 
The first item to be popped is considered to be to the left of the operator. 
[Space][Space]    Addition 
[Space][Tab]    Subtraction 
[Space][LF]    Multiplication 
[Tab][Space]    Integer Division 
6 
 
[Tab][Tab]    Modulo 
Heap Access (IMP: [Tab][Tab]) 
Heap access commands look at the stack to find the address of items to be stored or retrieved. To store an item, push 
the address then the value and run the store command. To retrieve an item, push the address and run the retrieve 
command, which will replace the address at the top of the stack. 
[Space]     Store 
[Tab]     Retrieve 
Flow Control (IMP: [LF][Space]) 
Flow control operations are also very common. Labels mark the targets of conditional and unconditional jumps as 
well as subroutines. Flow control operations allow high-level logic like loops, if-statements, and functions to be 
implemented. 
[Space][Space] (Parameter: Label) Mark a location in the program 
[Space][Tab] (Parameter: Label)  Call a subroutine 
[Space][LF] (Parameter: Label)  Jump unconditionally to a label 
[Tab][Space] (Parameter: Label)  Jump to a label if the top of the stack is zero 
[Tab][Tab] (Parameter: Label)  Jump to a label if the top of the stack is negative 
[Tab][LF]    End a subroutine and jump back to caller 
I/O Action (IMP: [Tab][LF]) 
We need to be able to interact with the user and the disk. There are I/O instructions for reading and writing numbers 
and individual characters. 
[Space][Space]    Output the character at the top of the stack 
[Space][Tab]    Output the number at the top of the stack 
[Tab][Space]    Read a character and place it on the top of the stack 
[Tab][Tab]    Read a number and place it on the top of the stack 
I/O Control (IMP [Tab][Space]) 
We need to be able to read and write from the disk or to communicate over a network. To do that, we will change the 
I/O stream from standard in/out to a file. 
[Space][Space]     Change I/O stream to a File -- get mode character and then  
 file path from the stack 
[Space][Tab] (Parameters: IP, Port)  Change I/O stream to TCP connection at IP, Port 
[Tab][Space]     Change I/O to standard in/out 
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NOTES: File mode is one of 3 characters: r, w, or a. Each file mode's functionality is equivalent to C language's r+, 
w+, and a+ modes. File path is between ‘{ }’ brackets and popped characters are arranged left-to-right (push characters 
onto the stack backwards so they are popped in order) 
Command Parameters 
Each parameter type is fixed-length. A binary data literal pushed onto the stack is either 32 bits (int) or 8 bits (char). 
At runtime, the type of data pushed onto the stack depends on the size of the parameter. Type checking is done before 
the data reaches the stack. where the data involved is explicitly declared by the language. Label parameters are 16 bits 
long, leaving room for 65,536 different labels. Network connection parameters are 48 bits long -- 32 bits to specify 
the IP address, followed by 16 bits to specify the port number. 
End of Figure 1 
Once the language was designed, the interpreter 
had to be written. I have decided to only explain the code 
at a high level rather than include the source in this thesis 
for two reasons. First, the source code contains many 
thousands of lines, and it would be too verbose to include 
in full. The second reason is due to the nature of the Jaws 
programming language. It may be ethically irresponsible 
to open-source the virtual machine before the threat it 
potentially poses is proven to be accounted for in 
antivirus software. 
As mentioned in the methodology, the Jaws 
virtual machine was written in the C programming 
language. To aid in speeding up the project’s 
development timeline, Flex and Bison [11] were used to 
generate C code for the parser. Flex and Bison are 
programs that generate a lexer and a parser (respectively) 
through the definition of a language’s tokens and 
grammar. Once the language specification above was 
translated into valid Flex and Bison files, they generated 
the lexer and parser parts of the Jaws virtual machine in 
the form of C code. 
Flex and Bison files are divided up into three 
sections. The first section is the control section. The 
control section includes things like C headers that will get 
placed in the generated file, as well as options for Flex or 
Bison when generating the lexer and parser. The Jaws 
virtual machine includes options for importing C libraries 
and keeping track of line numbers. The second section is 
specific to Flex or Bison. More on Jaws’ implementation 
of the second section is found in the following 
paragraphs. The last section contains C code to be copied 
verbatim to the generated parser. In the Jaws virtual 
machine’s source code, this section is for defining the 
‘main’ function of the interpreter. 
The first code that was written for the Jaws 
virtual machine was the Flex file that is used to generate 
the Jaws lexer. The Jaws Flex file only defines three 
tokens (Space, Tab, and Linefeed). Everything else is 
ignored as specified by a line containing the wildcard 
token for all other characters. All the lexer generated by 
Flex does is capture these three tokens and pass them on 
to the parser generated by Bison. The Jaws Flex file is 
relatively short, because there are only three tokens for 
the language and they are each only one character. 
Next, the Jaws Bison file was written for the 
generation of the parser. A Bison file’s second section 
consists of the formal grammar of the language with the 
tokens from the Flex lexer as terminals. Bison generates 
the parser from that formal grammar. The formal 
grammar for the Jaws programming language is defined 
in Figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2: Jaws Formal Grammar 
jaws (start symbol)  ⇒ <bodies> <last_body>   
 |  <last_body> 
bodies    ⇒  <bodies> <body>   
   |  <body> 
body   ⇒  <header> <instructions> <footer> 
last_body   ⇒  <header> <instructions> <end_program> 
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header   ⇒  <extra_lines> LF TAB SPACE   
   |  LF TAB SPACE 
footer   ⇒ LF TAB SPACE  
end_program  ⇒ <end_instruction> <extra_lines> 
 | <end_instruction> 
end_instruction  ⇒ LF LF LF  
extra_lines  ⇒ <extra_lines> <extra_line> 
 | <extra_line> 
extra_line  ⇒ SPACE 
 | TAB 
 | LF 
instructions  ⇒ <instructions> <instruction> 
   | <instruction> 
instruction  ⇒ <stack_manipulation> 
   | <arithmetic> 
   | <heap_access> 
   | <flow_control> 
   | <io_action> 
   | <io_control> 
stack_manipulation  ⇒ SPACE SPACE <stack_command> 
arithmetic  ⇒ SPACE TAB <arith_command> 
heap_access  ⇒ TAB TAB <heap_command> 
flow_control  ⇒ LF SPACE <flow_command> 
io_action  ⇒ TAB LF <io_action_command> 
io_control  ⇒ TAB SPACE <io_control_command> 
stack_command  ⇒ <stack_push> 
   | <stack_duplicate> 
   | <stack_swap> 
   | <stack_discard> 
arith_command  ⇒ <addition> 
   | <subtraction> 
   | <multiplication> 
   | <integer_division> 
   | <modulo> 
heap_command  ⇒ <heap_store> 
   | <heap_retrieve> 
flow_command  ⇒ <new_label> 
   | <call_subroutine> 
   | <uncond_jump> 
   | <jump_if_zero> 
   | <jump_if_neg> 
   | <end_subroutine> 
io_action_command  ⇒ <output_char> 
   | <output_int> 
   | <read_char> 
   | <read_int> 
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io_control_command  ⇒ <stream_file> 
   | <stream_net> 
   | <stream_stdio> 
stack_push  ⇒ SPACE <number> 
stack_duplicate  ⇒ LF SPACE  
stack_swap  ⇒ LF TAB 
stack_discard  ⇒ LF LF 
addition  ⇒ SPACE SPACE 
subtraction  ⇒ SPACE TAB 
multiplication  ⇒ SPACE LF 
integer_division  ⇒ TAB SPACE 
modulo  ⇒ TAB TAB 
heap_store  ⇒ SPACE 
heap_retrieve  ⇒ TAB 
new_label  ⇒ SPACE SPACE <label> 
call_subroutine  ⇒ SPACE TAB <label> 
uncond_jump  ⇒ SPACE LF <label> 
jump_if_zero  ⇒ TAB SPACE <label> 
jump_if_neg  ⇒ TAB TAB <label> 
end_subroutine  ⇒ TAB LF 
output_char  ⇒ SPACE SPACE 
output_int  ⇒ SPACE TAB 
read_char  ⇒ TAB SPACE 
read_int  ⇒ TAB TAB 
stream_file  ⇒ SPACE SPACE 
stream_net  ⇒ SPACE TAB <ip> <port> 
stream_stdio  ⇒ TAB SPACE 
number  ⇒ <bits> LF 
label  ⇒ <bits> LF 
bits  ⇒ <bits> <bit> 
   | <bit> 
ip  ⇒ <octet> <octet> <octet> <octet> 
octet  ⇒ <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> <bit> 
port  ⇒ <octet> <octet> LF 
bit  ⇒ SPACE 
   | TAB 
End of Figure 2 
10 
 
Next, the capability for Jaws code to be injected 
into whitespace-controlled programming languages like 
Python was added to the Jaws virtual machine. As 
mentioned earlier, in the case of a whitespace-controlled 
language like Python you can have arbitrary whitespace 
on lines separate from Python code. However, the 
whitespace characters in the lines of Python would break 
the functionality of the Jaws lines. For cases like that, a 
feature was added to the Jaws virtual machine that 
enables it to start and stop interpretation of whitespace 
characters using header and footer statements. Once the 
rest of the formal grammar was parsing correctly, the 
header and footer statement functionality was added into 
the grammar in the Jaws Bison File. 
The final part of the Jaws virtual machine that 
had to be written was the runtime system that would 
execute the code. The Jaws runtime system is 
implemented in pure C code. Having only written a single 
traditional compiler before this project, creating a 
runtime system for the Jaws virtual machine was 
uncharted territory for me. I initially had some 
preconceived notions of how to do it that I quickly 
figured out wouldn’t work. After brainstorming and 
consulting with my research advisor, Dr. Eugene 
Wallingford, I decided the best plan of action was to 
create multiple data structures to represent the program. 
There would be a data structure for a stack, a heap, an 
instruction, and a program (which contains an array of 
instructions). At the recommendation of Dr. Wallingford, 
I also created a data structure for a jump table that could 
help the runtime system execute jumps. Various 
functions to interact with each of these data structures 
were written. Lastly, semantic actions were added to the 
Bison file’s formal grammar to construct some of these 
structures during the parsing of Jaws code. 
Next, functions were created to represent each 
type of instruction defined in the language specification. 
A pointer to the corresponding instruction function is 
included in the instruction data structure once it is 
identified and created. As the program data structure 
iterates through the program, it simply keeps track of an 
instruction pointer and calls the instructions’ functions as 
they come. Flow control operations may modify the 
instruction pointer, allowing for instructions to be called 
more than once. 
Lastly, a lot of error-checking code was added 
to both the parser and the runtime system. It is important 
for a compiler or interpreter to provide informative error 
messages. Jaws error messages display the type of error, 
exactly why it happened, which instruction type caused 
the error, and what line of code the error occurred on. 
Once error-checking was done being added, the Jaws 
virtual machine was finished. 
The complete Jaws virtual machine can indeed 
run ‘invisible code’ that is completely composed of 
Spaces, Tabs, and Linefeeds. Below, Figure 3 shows the 
traditional ‘Hello World’ program on the left written in 
Jaws (with spaces and tabs highlighted for visual aid). 
The output of the program is displayed on the right. 
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Figure 3: Hello World Jaws Program 
 
As mentioned earlier, it was also necessary to 
create a visible language that can compile into Jaws code. 
This enables anyone to write and debug code much more 
quickly when developing Jaws programs. The name of 
the visible Jaws code is “Fin”. The Fin language has a 
traditional compiler that outputs Jaws code rather than 
executing a runtime system. For the Fin compiler, Flex 
and Bison were used again to generate the lexer and 
parser. That allowed me to reuse a lot of the formal 
grammar I defined in Jaws’s Bison file. 
The Flex file for the Fin compiler was quite a bit 
more work than it was for Jaws. Jaws only has three 
tokens, but a readable version of Fin called for a separate 
token for each instruction. For example, ‘add’, ‘sub’, 
‘mult’, and ‘div’ are all individual tokens, rather than 
each one being made of the same three characters. 
Another thing that added complexity to the Fin 
lexer was the addition of literals as tokens. In Jaws, 
instruction parameters such as numbers and IP addresses 
were simply defined in binary, with 1 being a Tab and 0 
being a Space. However, in order to write code more 
easily, functionality was added to Fin to be able to write 
things like “2048”, “C”, and “127.0.0.1:22” as 
parameters. To do this, regular expressions were defined 
for each literal. Other than the number of tokens and the 
regular expressions for the literals, there wasn’t anything 
else that needed to be modified in the Fin Flex file. 
A lot of the existing Jaws grammar was able to 
be copied to the Fin Bison file due to the two languages 
having the same syntactic structure. The tokens coming 
in from the lexer had to be redefined, and their 
corresponding terminal symbols had to be replaced in the 
grammar. Other than that, though, the formal grammar 
remained mostly the same. Once all the tokens were 
parsing correctly, code generation was the final part of 
the Fin compiler. 
The code generation for the Fin compiler ended 
up being fairly simple. First, a Jaws output file to write to 
was declared in the main function of the parser. Then 
semantic actions were placed after each terminal symbol 
in the Bison grammar. Each semantic action writes the 
corresponding Jaws invisible character combination to 
the output file. Once that was complete, some polish was 
added to the Fin compiler. Command line arguments for 
specifying the output file and suppressing visible 
annotation of the Jaws code were added as options. 
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Additionally, makefiles and man pages were added to 
both the Fin compiler and the Jaws virtual machine to aid 
in ease of distribution. 
 
VI. Expected Findings & Conclusion 
Unfortunately, the goal of testing the hypothesis 
was not able to be completed before the submission of 
this thesis due to the time constraints that one semester 
affords and the amount of time it takes to write an 
interpreter and compiler. I was not able to do enough 
testing of malware written in Jaws code to be able to 
present any findings. I was, however, able to prove that a 
polyglot, interpreted programming language can exist. 
The Jaws programming language is designed to exploit 
every weakness of current antivirus models. The next 
steps in this research are to develop malware using the 
Jaws programming language and to run various tests 
against antivirus software to see if malicious code written 
in Jaws is able to be detected. Once proper testing is able 
to occur, it is expected that the proof of concept malware 
is able to evade all leading antivirus programs by 
exploiting an unintended weakness in the overall design. 
In addition to the expected findings, it is 
important that design changes can be offered for current 
antivirus models that would mitigate the threat developed 
in the proof of concept. Currently, the design change for 
antivirus software that would be suggested is to add 
functionality to detect unknown interpreters. This would 
enable the antivirus to flag programs as suspicious. 
However, because an interpreter is not inherently 
malicious, this would still require laborious human 
analysis and is an inelegant solution in my opinion. A 
better solution may be quite complex. Therefore, 
additional research may also be needed in that case to 
ensure that the threat is adequately mitigated. 
If the expected findings hold true, a 
programming language like Jaws would effectively 
render all antivirus software useless. If existing or future 
malware were to be rewritten in Jaws, they would be able 
to run without detection on any computer. The 
implications of this would be extrememly detrimental to 
the security of all computers. Private research like this  is 
important in taking the advantage over malicious cyber 
adversaries because it allows us to stay ahead of the bad 
guys instead of cleaning up a mess when they discover 
something like Jaws. This alternative approach to 
malware research shows that anti-malware models can be 
improved through responsible development and 
disclosure of new types of malware and evasion 
techniques.  
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